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Theatrics surrounding the Uttarakhand Tragedy

2013-07-04T04:24:13Z

In India, tragic incidents have always been marked by theatrics and drama by the political class much to the chagrin of those who suffer at its hands. The mass tragedy caused by the Uttarakhand floods didn’t spared our eminent politicians from trying to hog the limelight in this hour of heart rending tragedy. Be it be the lackadaisical approach of the Uttarakhand Chief Minister who was busy scheduling his Switzerland itinerary or the way Narendra Modi ( our much hailed NaMo ) campaigned for his Gujarat model even while he had gone to visit the flood affected areas . Also the goof up which his PR agency made while announcing that he flew down 15,000 Gujaratis from Uttarakhand on his own. The overenthusiastic Indian media didn’t even cared to check the veracity of the statement and publicized it even more quite zealously. It was quite late that an Article published in TOI made sense enough to rubbish such outrageous claims. Narendra Modi’s offer to help by giving away his helicopters and to build Kedarnath Temple was also shown the door by the Uttarakhand Chief Minister.

Then when Narendra Modi left then we had a famous duel between TDP & Congress leaders of Andhra Pradesh who wanted the victims to fly with them. This is not yet over, the biggest one is yet to come . While till now we kept on talking about how these parties tried to hog the limelight, the biggest of these public gimmicks was done by none other than Sonia Gandhi who waited 72 crucial hours while the survivors died out of hunger and lack of water to ‘flag off’ the trucks carrying relief materials after Rahul Gandhi returned from his Spain trip. This was shambolic and a shining example of the ebbs to which politicians have fallen in modern India that they kept on delaying it so as to gain some brownie points in the eyes of the common public. I am starkly critical of all these incidents as they yet again proved that Politics is a selfish ‘business’ in India and is yet to rise above petty things even in hours of crisis . In the face of this tragedy, the man who disappointed the most was Uttarakhand CM- Vijay Bahuguna. He was busy alleging the centre that it didn’t had any mechanism to deal with such catastrophe rather than taking the blame on himself as to how around 67,000 tourists were allowed in the region even when Metrological Department has issued several warnings. His counter allegations and refusal to accept Narendra Modi’s help of over two dozen helicopters and his offer to help reconstruct Kedarnath Temple was met with widespread angst. However, it can be argued that Modi’s intent was also to gain brownie points by doing this and hence he publicised this quite openly.

Rescue operations by the Army Personnels .

Heroism was in vogue among politicians amidst the rising number of people who were dying and were being rescued at Ground Zero by the real heroes of this tragedy – i.e., the Army personnel who helped them selflessly to ensure that they were rescued safely. Congress MLA from MP Sanjay Pathak claimed that he saved some passengers through his helicopter and this led to almost a stampede at the Dehradun Airport with every politician lining up his aircraft so as to ‘claim’ that he ‘saved’ x number of people. All this was happening when there were not even centres to keep track and information of all the missing people in the tragedy .

I am not a pessimist but my optimism has lost in colour by the incidents that I saw in this hour of crisis. While some leaders were shedding crocodile tears over the issue, they had done less to ensure that more problems do not further arise due to it. Much of the Relief work was even stopped when Sonia Gandhi and PM Manmohan Singh were taking an aerial survey of the flood affected areas, quite ensconced in their private luxury jet while people were dying due to hunger. It’s such a shame that while Politics was supposed to be a noble profession to serve the society, it has rather become a selfish and profitable business in the present scenario in the World’s Largest Democracy.

The Rescue operation is over by now and many people are still missing and are trapped within the debris. This tragic incident exposed the vulnerability of our Disaster management Techniques and made a mockery of all the grand claims that the Govt. had made post the 2004 Tsunami which had killed 11,000 people in India. The estimated death toll is expected to touch 3,000 at least with more than that people still missing. Vijay Bahuguna , Narendra Modi and Rahul Gandhi are mere names , the thing which we need to cleanse the most is the standard at which politics is done in India . While Politicians keep on denying their obligations and continue their blame game , it’s the life of the common man that suffers the most .

- Shashank Saurav

The Malian Conflict and International Law

2013-02-13T14:36:55Z

“You are asking what would we do to the terrorists if we find them? We will destroy them.” These were the words of French President, Francois Hollande, a few days after having launched Operation Serval, the French military intervention in Mali. The ongoing situation is far more complicated, however, than it may appear from Hollande’s strident rhetoric – at least from a legal perspective. This article aims to provide a short account of the three main issues of international law raised by the French action: the question of the lawfulness of the intervention, the implications for international humanitarian and human rights law and the significance of the investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) now underway.

The lawfulness of the French intervention

In order to justify legally the military intervention in Mali, France put forward three arguments: an invitation by the Malian government, its right of collective self-defense and the authorization given by the United Nations (UN) Security Council in Resolution 2085 (20 December 2012). Although this multi-layered approach may have carried weight politically speaking, invoking the three separate legal grounds considerably undermined Paris’ overall position as the first is the only one capable of rendering the intervention lawful. Indeed, neither self-defense nor Resolution 2085 can justify the actions of the French military. In politics, it seems, the validity of a set of arguments is less important than the number advocated.

Considering that France had been officially invited to intervene by Malian authorities in order to defeat Jihadists in the north of the country, Operation Serval can be considered as lawful under international law. This may seem overly simple, but as Mali gave its consent to the operation, no further legal justification was required. At the same time, France still felt it necessary to invoke the other two arguments based on the UN Charter. Yet, as these fail to strengthen the case for intervention, they instead undermine the whole legal basis. Let us explain.

Under international law, the use of armed force by a state against the territory of another state can be justified either by virtue of an authorization given by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – the so-called collective security system – or in case of individual or collective self defense.

The system of authorization (delegation) was born from the practice of the Security Council in order to keep the collective security system alive. Indeed, given the Security Council could not launch military interventions under its own command and control (because states always refused to make available their armed forces), it decided to delegate the use of force to states. According to this system, states can lawfully launch military operations abroad as soon as the Security Council authorizes them to use “all necessary means” to maintain or restore international peace and security.

In Resolution 2085, the Security Council “authorize[d] the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year, which [should] take all necessary measures.” At first glance, France could legitimately invoke this resolution to justify its intervention in Mali. Except, that is, the military intervention had to be under African command and control. Although France had the consent of the Malian authorities in launching Operation Serval, this does not actually constitute compliance with Resolution 2085 as Africans were not in charge. The argument of the legality of the French military intervention on account of the authorization therefore falls flat.

The argument of self-defense put forward by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, also fails to hold. Under international law, several conditions must be met in order for the right of self defense to be invoked. In the case of Mali, two were not fulfilled: the “armed attack condition” and the suspension of the exercise of self-defense once “the Security Council has taken measures to maintain peace and security.”

In order to exercise self-defense, there must be an armed attack of certain gravity by one state against another. In other words, the armed attack must be led by a state, not a non-state actor. Although this position still remains controversial, it has been confirmed twice by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2004) and in its decision in the case Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (2005). Mali was not the victim of an armed attack by a state. The military intervention was a response to acts of violence perpetrated by a constellation of non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and the Ansar Dine movement.

Similarly, as self-defense may be exercised only “until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain peace and security,” as soon as the Security Council opens Chapter VII and makes decisions in this context, the right of states to self-defense is suspended. On 20 December, the Security Council decided to act under Chapter VII by adopting Resolution 2085. From this date, therefore, the right of self-defense was suspended and could not be invoked by France.

Implications for international humanitarian law and international human rights law

International humanitarian law (IHL) is a branch of international law applicable in situations of armed conflict. More specifically, IHL covers two types of armed conflicts: international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. In the present situation, some basic questions of applicability must be clarified: is there an armed conflict in Mali? If so, is it international or non-international and what are the parties to the conflict? According to precedents from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.” This definition covers both types of armed conflict recognized under IHL.

Turning to the situation in Mali, there is no international armed conflict, because there is no confrontation between states. The same conclusion cannot be reached, however, in relation to the existence of non-international armed conflict. The definition outlined above contains two decisive criteria concerning the applicability of IHL in such circumstances: the intensity of violence (expressed through the term “protracted”) and the organization of armed groups. Analyzing the facts in Northern Mali, one could argue armed confrontations that took place before the French military intervention – between different armed groups (Islamic or rebel groups) on the one hand, and between these groups and the Malian Army on the other – can be considered a non-international armed conflict. Indeed, these groups were well organized and the intensity of the violence was sufficient to meet the criteria.

In principle, the French military intervention did not change the nature of the conflict, given French forces are supporting the Malian Army against Islamic armed groups. Since Operation Serval began, however, it has been difficult to identify precisely the members of Islamic armed groups, as they have assimilated themselves amongst the civilian population. This complicates the situation, as IHL applies to parties to a conflict – the rules cannot be applied if it is impossible to identify those parties. Challenges in identification also make it difficult to assess levels of organization. Furthermore, these groups combine both criminal and terrorist activities, placing coalition forces in a dilemma. It is difficult to know whether such individuals must be treated as mere criminals, or members of armed groups fighting on a battlefield. This point is crucial to the rules governing the use of lethal force, which are more flexible under IHL than in the international human rights law applicable to police operations. As a consequence, coalition forces have to take into account both sets of rules, applying them on a case-by-case basis.

Another question linked to the applicability of IHL versus international human rights law relates to the legal status of Jihadists potentially captured by French or Malian forces. It is well known that IHL does not allow for prisoner of war status in non-international armed conflicts due to the reluctance of states to concede such rights for non-state actors. As such, these individuals could be prosecuted for the mere fact of having taken up arms against the government. In this case, they would benefit from IHL norms linked to common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II to the conventions, as well as judicial guarantees provided by international human rights law.

And what if French forces decide to transfer detainees to Malian authorities? Is France obliged to apply its human rights obligations even in an extraterritorial context? As a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, France is obliged to respect the convention even if its forces are operating extraterritorially. This includes the obligation not to transfer any detainee to Malian authorities if there is a real risk of violation of fundamental rights, such as the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to life and the right to a fair trial. In order to avoid any risk of violation of these rights when detainees are transferred to Malian authorities, France should sign agreements ensuring the protection of these obligations.

The ICC investigation: consequences and concerns

The Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has formally opened an investigation over the possible perpetration of international crimes in Mali. The decision was made public through a press release on 16 January, roughly six months after the opening of a preliminary examination into the situation in the country. Bensouda had determined there was a reasonable basis to believe that heinous crimes had already been committed in Mali, including murder, mutilation, rape, summary executions and unlawful attacks against protected objects.

The ICC is a permanent international criminal tribunal created by means of a treaty, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which entered into force in 2002. Mali is one of the parties to that treaty. Whilst the ICC has jurisdiction over a variety of human actions – war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and (in the future) aggression – investigations can only be launched in certain conditions. Indeed, the Office of the Prosecutor can either open an investigation itself in relation to specific cases leading to the reasonable belief that serious crimes have been committed, or wait until the UN Security Council or a state party asks it to scrutinize a situation. In the case of Mali, the latter description fits.

It is worth clarifying that states, as well as the Security Council, cannot formally refer specific ‘cases.’ That is, targeting individuals or groups for potential prosecution. Instead, they can only refer ‘situations,’ meaning perpetrators from the two (or more) sides of a conflict are subject equally to the scrutiny of ICC investigators. As emphasized by Bensouda in a 28 January statement, the ICC will examine both the behavior of the rebels, as well as the conduct of Malian governmental forces, the French military and AFISMA troops. Allegations of possible crimes perpetrated by the ‘governmental’ side to the conflict have already been raised by human rights NGO Amnesty International, in a report released on 1 February.

It is also important to remember the ICC exercises a ‘complementary’ rather than absolute jurisdiction. In other words, the Prosecutor can only pursue those cases that have not been genuinely investigated or prosecuted at the domestic level, and for which the competent state is unable or unwilling to do so. One could argue that a state self-referral is in itself evidence of the inability or unwillingness of that state to prosecute domestically certain crimes, but this does not prevent the ICC from tackling the complementarity assessment in due course. Indeed, this is even more relevant given some of Mali’s neighbors (for example, Burkina Faso) have legislated to ensure the state exercises domestic criminal jurisdiction over ‘Rome Statute’ crimes, wherever carried out. Alleged perpetrators of serious crimes in Mali could potentially seek refuge in one of these countries.

Yet, despite the unquestioned urgency of bringing to justice those responsible for international crimes, the ICC investigation raises at least two legitimate concerns. Firstly, the Office of the Prosecutor is once again using its authority to focus on the African continent, which has been the only region providing work for ICC judges to date. Given the Mali investigation is drawing upon already scarce financial resources, this could make it harder for Bensouda to undertake new investigations in the near future – for instance, a referral of the Syrian situation. Some commentators have also pointed out that the ICC investigation is unlikely to have any deterrent effect on the parties to the conflict. This might be true in the case of the rebels, but not necessarily with regard to Malian governmental forces and the foreign troops now present on Malian territory. Arguably, ICC investigations like the one in Mali represent a positive challenge for the increased credibility and effectiveness of international criminal justice.

The authors would like to express their gratitude to Professor Paola Gaeta for her kindness and assistance in contributing to helpful discussion on the legal issues dealt with in this article. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.

Opinions voiced by Global Minds do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Global Journal.

Framing an Intervention in Mali by Julie Mandoyan for The Global Journal.

Photo © DR

A Place Only Soldiers and Children Can See

2012-09-04T14:08:59Z

The battle in Afghanistan continues after ten long years. Beyond the frontlines and the fighting, a generation has grown up amidst the ‘reality’ and ‘insanity’ of conflict. For one returned US Army Reserve Captain, the moments shared with these forgotten women and children will forever shape her understanding of war.

After ten years people tend to forget. They tend to forget what war does. What it does to soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. What it does to the women and children who are ‘lucky’ enough to live through it, and grow up knowing nothing but war. War plays with the mind. It blends the worlds of reality and insanity and creates a new place that only soldiers and children see. That was made clear on a trip I took to Daykundi Province in 2011 to visit one of the ‘Cultural Support Teams’. These all-female teams were established by the US Army and Marines to reach out to the half of the population that people tend to forget about – women and children.

It was visiting one of those small villages that helped me understand what war does. The Taliban once controlled this particular village. That fact was difficult to imagine because I was able to walk, hand-in-hand, with small children to a nearby local home to visit some of the women. The Afghan men in this particular village had grown tired of the Taliban and decided to join the Afghan local police to protect their homes by the time I arrived in May of 2011.

The hospitality in Afghanistan is like nothing I’d ever seen or experienced before. The women welcomed us in with hugs and kisses to sit and talk. They cooked for us, and as we ate our Afghan rice and laughed together, it seemed for a brief moment entirely possible that this small reality we created in this clay home could actually last. We talked about their families and daughters; we brought them some fresh pineapple that had come in on the last military shipment. The sour look on their faces right before they spat out the pineapple and laughed was priceless. The meeting only lasted about two hours, but after we left their home and walked back to the small forward operating base, I sat under the brilliant stars of the Afghan sky with a feeling I could only describe as euphoric. I was naïve enough to believe in possibility and hope. I was naïve enough to think a moment like that could last.

It was what happened the next day, and every day after that helped me to understand what happens in a war. I was asked to grab my camera to document a small child, and when I finally saw him, I understood why. I watched as the young Special Forces medic tenderly treated the three-year old boy with burns to over 80 percent of his body. I saw the care and sadness in his eyes as he cleaned his wounds and administered morphine. It was then that the reality of the world I was in kicked me in the teeth. It was then I received my education on war.

To read the entire report, subscribe or order a copy of The Global Journal.

Text and Photography by Rebecca Murga.

Fawzia Koofi- Fearless Voice

2012-05-18T17:56:14Z

Fawzia Koofi is a leader with a vision: to change Afghanistan into a society that is based on the rule of law, civility, and human rights. Despite numerous attacks on her life, what she is most afraid of is “being misunderstood by people.”

What is Afghanistan’s biggest challenge at the moment?

As you know, the country right now is at a very critical time. Both in terms of security, which is a big challenge but also lack of good governance. There is no strong government to be able to deliver proper services to the people of Afghanistan— such as rule of law and service delivery—a government that is able to provide people with jobs. Corruption is also a major problem in Afghanistan.

How do you feel about the foreign troops withdrawing soon?

What is the atmosphere in Afghanistan, what do people think about it? The international community set up this plan to withdraw in 2014, which is very close, two years from now. This is also a very important year for Afghanistan because we will have presidential elections, so there will be a political transition of power as well. The international community came to Afghanistan with two objectives: to help the people of Afghanistan establish a strong government, and for security reasons. I think that we were not able to achieve both objectives. I think that the links to the Taliban and Al-Qaida are still there, I think they have become stronger, I think their social standing has expanded and they can be, at any time, a security threat for Afghanistan and for our international friends. Given the fact that the security in Afghanistan is one of the main challenges, I think the 2014 withdrawal is not realistic. The people in Afghanistan are very anxious and confused. This planned withdrawal is based on ground realities from the West, not based on ground realities in Afghanistan. I think the best solution would be to have elections in 2014 and to prepare the ground for a transparent and fair election, and then gradually, once we had a strong government, the international community could depart from Afghanistan. But like this, it will not resolve in peace in Afghanistan. We would like Afghanistan to stand on its own feet, but the problem is that it’s not like that now.

Your book The Favored Daughter was not only about your personal story but also a quest to find Afghanistan’s identity. After 33 years of war and conflict how do you see the country’s identity?

Thank you very much for that description. In fact, that was one of the objectives in writing this book. To let people know the other side of Afghan history and Afghanistan. It is not just terrorism and war but it’s a country of culture and value and a country of relationships and natural resources. I think the past ten years changed Afghanistan’s identity to a large extent. Now you go to different countries and you see that Afghanistan is respected as a national identity. I think that it is a very good achievement. Part of the challenge now is to fill the lack of vision. I think the country is going in the right direction to reveal its own identity. Afghanistan has its own culture, its own values with its own tradition. Some of those traditions are actually good traditions, particularly the family values and the family relationship. They helped women and children, especially during the war. Without the family system you can imagine how many women and children would be on the streets now in Afghanistan. But luckily, because of the strong family values, we do not have as many homeless women and children that you find in many other post-conflict countries.

Amidst the Carnage, Syria Finds a Loyal Ally in Hugo Chávez

2012-04-25T12:26:32Z

At a time when most nations are trying to figure out how to stop Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad from killing his own people in a year-long struggle to stay in power, the Venezuelan government is helping to prop him up.

The facts and figures coming out of Syria are grisly, with more than 9,000 dead since last spring. On an average day, 50 citizens are shot and killed by government security forces. Bridges and roads out of the country are blown up, preventing civilians from fleeing. Doctors are ordered to tranquilize torture victims so that they cannot speak to international observers. Journalists are assassinated. Children and women are slaughtered. Historically, the Assad regime has been a bad one, committing undeniable crimes against humanity.

Bashar's barbarism cannot be overstated. Together with his father Hafez's bloody regime, Syria has endured 41 years of Assad family rule. This puts the father-son duo in competition with North Korea and Cuba for longest dynastic dictatorship.

It comes as a shock, therefore, to see this New York Times headline: "As Others Isolate Syria, Chávez Ships Fuel to It." And another stunner from Reuters: "Venezuela to ship more fuel to Syria as crackdown spreads." Grotesquely, even as Assad intensifies his repression, the Venezuelan government provides the supplies he needs to keep his military machine powerful and deadly. While other nations boycott selling fuel to Syria on human rights grounds, Venezuela persists, having sent more than 600,000 barrels of oil in the past few months. A country like Russia, with economic and strategic investments in Syria, is expected to side with Assad, as are other states with no moral compass beyond national interests. Yet, even some of these nations, like Saudi Arabia, are now calling for Assad to stop the slaughter.

Meanwhile in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez's party has unanimously approved a measure of solidarity with the Syrian regime, hailing its so-called reforms and praising it as a role model. Correo del Orinoco, a state-funded paper, continues to publish pro-Assad commentary. The president and his cabinet have, on numerous occasions, publicly and fiercely defended the fuel shipments and given their "strongest support" to the Syrian tyrant.

Chávez's loyalty to Assad - now being tested to the extreme - is not a new development, as the leaders have enjoyed close ties for years. Chávez has visited Syria twice in his presidential capacity, and on the latest trip, Assad renamed a street in Damascus in his honor. When addressing the Venezuelan public, Chávez often refers to Assad as "our brother." In 2010, he hosted Assad's first stop on his South American tour, an event praised to the heavens by American-born Eva Golinger, Chavez's chief propagandist, and recapped at length by Syria's official state news agency. Their conclusion - that stronger Syria-Venezuela ties would "guarantee a free and democratic world where peace and respect prevail" - stands today as painfully ironic. Inside Venezuela, more than one million citizens are of Syrian descent. Many of them have recently taken to the streets of Caracas to rally against Chávez's support of Assad. Such public protest is risky business. As Al Jazeera has recently reported, local Syrian diplomats note who gets involved, and when those individuals return to Damascus airport, they can become targets of the police state. But, as families are being gradually destroyed, these protestors are growing louder.

Why is Chávez so willing to support such a global pariah, risking credibility abroad and even instability at home? Some point to a 2010 agreement wherein Venezuela trades diesel for Syrian food. This accord does not accomplish much from a strategic or economic point of view, but has aided Chávez in his quest for photo ops with leaders of the world's worst governments. His antics have been the same with Iran, Zimbabwe, and Qaddafi's Libya. It is all evidence of Chávez's remarkable track record of admiration for serial rights abusers. The Venezuelan leader himself argues that the uprising in Syria is a Western conspiracy, not an organic rebellion. Last spring, he even painted Assad as the victim, claiming that "terrorists are being infiltrated into Syria and producing violence and death," and accusing the international media of jumping to the conclusion "once again" that "the guilty one is the president." His own bizarre reasoning aside, the reality is that Chávez simply doesn't give a damn about human suffering in Syria. In a recent interview with The New York Times, his minister of oil and mining Rafael Ramírez explained Venezuela's support of the criminal Syrian regime: "If they need diesel and we can supply it, there is no reason not to do it." This isn't blindness or ignorance, as Chávez's intelligence informs him of what is happening in Syria. Rather, this seems to be intransigence. As one of his critics so incisively observed, Chávez doesn't just go to the cemetery with his friends - he buries himself with them. With his own elections approaching in October, and with the Venezuelan people growing increasingly confused by his support for a murderous despot, this may turn out to be the case.

The article was co-authored by Thor Halvorssen, president of the Human Rights Foundation and founder of the Oslo Freedom Forum, and Alex Gladstein, OFF's vice president of strategy.

(Photo © Hassan Ammar/Associated Press)

#48 - Viva Rio

2012-01-23T13:06:37Z

Check out if Viva Rio is in The Top 100 NGOs 2013 Edition!

Tackling violence through social inclusion.

Projects in Brazil, Haiti and East Timor.

Viva Rio defines itself on the basis of its struggle against violence, for peace, and against social exclusion. The organization was founded in 1993 as a reaction to escalating levels of urban violence in Rio de Janeiro, including nationwide dismay following the Candelaria and Vigário Geral massacres. Drawing together representatives from different sectors of civil society, Viva Rio is committed to promoting a culture of peace and social development through direct programming and research, and by contributing to the design of effective public policies.

The organization delivers numerous projects targeting three integrated areas of concern – community outreach, communication and human security. Guided by an evidence-based framework, each project is first tested as a pilot before being scaled to the city, regional or national level. Viva Rio’s programs include youth education and job-market training, connecting slum populations to the wider city through technology-driven social networks, the ‘Rio Desarma-se’ (Rio Disarm Yourself) campaign to remove civilian firearms from circulation, and institutional reform work with the metropolitan police.

Reflecting the organization’s unique expertise and impact, Viva Rio has also added an international dimension to its activities, implementing a security and development program alongside the UN in Haiti since 2004, and replicating its ‘Viva Favela’ digital inclusion program in East Timor.

(Photo © Viva Rio)

#30 - CeaseFire

2012-01-23T12:49:46Z

Check out if Cure Violence (formerly CeaseFire) is in The Top 100 NGOs 2013 Edition!

Violence prevention as disease control.

67 percent reduction in shootings in 1 year.

In 2000, Chicago’s West Garfield Park neighborhood had one of the highest murder rates in the United States. Five years earlier, Gary Slutkin, an experienced epidemiologist, had established the Chicago Project for Violence Protection after becoming convinced that the trajectory of an infectious disease and that of violence shared similar patterns. By this reasoning, one could treat each with the same public health strategy – stopping transmission at the source and changing behavior patterns so that fewer people became infected in the first place.

Initially focusing – unsuccessfully – on an outreach program aimed at fostering youth employment and education as a means to prevent violence, Slutkin realized he was not reaching the most ‘infectious’ individuals. Adjusting his approach, he founded CeaseFire as a stand-alone pilot project in West Garfield Park and watched as his hunch proved correct – by the end of its first year the organization’s innovative model had produced a stunning 67 percent reduction in shootings.

CeaseFire identifies those who have been most ‘infected’ by urban violence and treats this core group through a staff of ‘violence interrupters’ – former perpetrators employed to disrupt armed conflicts and educate the community about the consequences of violent behaviour. As testament to its success, the organization’s model has now been replicated in 15 American cities and four countries worldwide.

#33 - International Crisis Group

2012-01-23T12:49:15Z

Check out if International Crisis Group is in The Top 100 NGOs 2013 Edition!

Ringing warning bells before conflict occurs.

Analysts based in over 60 countries.

When the International Crisis Group was ranked as one of the top global think tanks in 2008, its then head Gareth Evans, though appreciative, was at pains to put paid to common misconception. Citing the organization’s strong field presence and focus on direct advocacy with decision makers, he remarked “we would prefer to call ourselves a ‘global conflict prevention and resolution organization’… we are more action than academically oriented.”

Founded in 1995, the International Crisis Group has quickly developed a global reach. With 130 permanent staff from 49 countries speaking 47 languages, the organization is dedicated to preventing and resolving conflicts through a combination of field-based analysis, judicious policy prescriptions and high-level advocacy. While its authoritative reporting on conflict dynamics has, in itself, established the organization as the world’s leading independent source of analysis and advice to governments and international actors, it is its ability to leverage the collective influence of its board of trustees – comprised of former statesmen and women – that sets it apart.

The organization has contributed behind-thescenes support and advice to critical peace negotiations – for instance in Sudan and Burundi – has provided detailed information unobtainable elsewhere – as on the Islamic Courts in Somalia – and has continued to ring early warning bells through its ‘CrisisWatch’ bulletin and ‘conflict alerts’.

Goodbye LRA

2011-12-12T10:14:08Z

Since the 1980s, a Ugandan rebel group calling themselves the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been raping and murdering civilians and turning young children into killing machines in an area of Africa that includes the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the new state of South Sudan and western Uganda.

In October, President Barack Obama decided to send 100 Special Forces to try and eliminate the LRA and its leader Joseph Kony. On Wednesday, Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, at a talk at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, said US troops sent to Uganda would not engage in combat operations themselves and that the US interest is humanitarian.

“We believe the LRA’s actions are an affront to human dignity and a threat to regional stability,” he said.

He also clarified that despite “some confusion in the media” and “conspiracy theories in the press” the deployment is “focused on the LRA and the LRA only.”

Carson said the US troops are there in a supportive and advisory role to help the forces of the four countries to develop the military skills to wipe out the LRA, which currently has about 150 to 200 troops - thanks to Uganda’s military forces, which have killed and captured a number of officers. The last time U.S. troops were sent to an African conflict zone was in 2003 when a group of marines was sent to Liberia.

Last month, the African Union formally declared the LRA a terrorist group, and pushed for the United Nations Security Council to do the same, marking the first time Africa's security body has issued such a statement. Kony was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2005 on war crimes charges, but has remained on the loose.

In Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s report to the UN Security Council last month, he said that regional military operations against the LRA must continue, but acknowledged that national militaries in the region did not have the resources and capabilities to deal with the problem.

There are a number of challenges to this mission, Carson said. The LRA are operating in small groups across densely forested and jungle terrain in one of the least developed regions in Africa without even basic roads and telecommunications.

Carson urged LRA fighters and abductees to defect and escape and told the story of two pregnant women who courageously escaped from the LRA in the middle of the night. “They walked for four days, crossing three rivers,” he explained.

Those who escape will be given help and repatriated back to their communities, he assured, “A future free of the LRA is possible.”

(Photo © DR)

Palestine's Dreams Dashed?

2011-11-15T19:22:43Z

It looks like Palestine’s hopes for being granted full membership to the United Nations may be dashed. A UN admissions committee could not reach a consensus and get the nine votes the Palestinian Authority would need for the Security Council to approve its application.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas expressed his desire to be granted full membership at the UN annual meetings in September against the wishes of the US and Israel. But the bid is controversial. If a Palestinian state was recognized it would be on territory currently under Israeli occupation and the Security Council would be forced to act against the occupation of one member state by another.

The Security Council bid has support from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and possibly Gabon and Nigeria, still shy of the nine out of 15 votes needed. The US promised that even if Palestine got the nine votes it would veto the measure because it sees Palestine’s U.N. bid as an attempt to undermine peace talks with Israel. A veto would be bad news for the US because it would cause tensions with the Arab world.

The US was not the only country against Palestine’s push for membership. France's president Nicolas Sarkozy said that France would abstain at the Security Council, but said he would support a move to upgrade Paelstine’s status to a non-member permanent observer state. Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel also said that she would vote against admitting Palestine as a UN member state. Meanwhile, Britain said it would abstain from voting on the bid.

In a vote to make Palestine an observer state, no country has a veto and only a simple majority is required. The worry for the US and Israel is that if the Palestinians were to become a permanent observer state to the UN it would open up access to membership in UN-related agencies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), where they could bring charges against Israel.

If Palestine believes it meets the criteria for statehood set out in the 1933 Montevideo convention, another option is for it to appeal to the World Court (ICJ) to see if members of the Security Council were justified in denying Palestine’s application. The World Court would have to decide whether members of the Security Council made their decision on the Montevideo convention alone and not based on political considerations.