theglobaljournal.net: Latest articles of Anca Cretu

Central and Eastern Europe: Media Freedom and the Struggles of Brussels

2013-02-08T20:53:52Z

Media freedom remains elusive and yet necessary in the post-communist sphere. The European Union, in particular, struggles to find the middle ground between intervention, controlling the media, and supporting full decommunization. Indeed, recent events in Romania, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic exemplify Brussels’ indecision.

On 4 February 2013, Jose Manuel Barroso warned that media campaigns threaten Romanian judicial institutions. In a statement, Barroso noted, “we cannot dismiss the fact that we have received complaints by the Constitutional Court, by the Superior Council of Magistracy, about campaigns orchestrated in the media against the independence of the magistrates, either prosecutors or judges.” Similar concerns were raised earlier in a commission report on Romania’s rule of law published on 30 January. The paper further stated that the Romanian government must “review existing standards to safeguard a free and pluralist media while ensuring effective redress…against undue pressure or intimidation from the media against the judiciary.” This report raises some extremely controversial points concerning the level of involvement of the EU. On a domestic level, Romania’s recent political situation depended on the judiciary. Yet the continuous lack of transparency in the decision-making process within the judicial branch led to harsh criticism as well as internal debate among magistrates.

The lack of transparency highlights real problems within the Romanian judicial system, and subsequently contradicts many aspects of the Commission’s report. Given the facts, Brussels’ position is baffling and in fact, the conclusions have the potential to worsen the situation. Romanian authorities and media leaders, for example, might mistake the commission’s report as permission to silence criticisms against the presidency or government.

Yet more than an overly critical media, the main issue remains the level of political clientelism and corruption within the media sector. There are often a notable number of state actors in the media sector and many members of the National Audiovisual Council are political appointees. Taking these facts into consideration, Diana Olivia Hatneanu, from the Romanian Helsinki Committee observed, “The wording of the EU rule of law report is too vague and leaves room for authorities to take measures against independent media.”

The Romanian case, however, is only one example of the EU’s questionable media interventions. Hungary, for instance, also experienced similar contradictory attitudes from Brussels. In May 2012, The EU condemned Hungary for new media laws, which politicized media regulations and imposed balanced reporting requirements, by obliging online and print media to register with authorities. Yet more than this, the Hungarian prime minister directly appoints the president of the Media Council and the council itself remains firmly entrenched in the state. Furthermore, the nine-year tenure of its members can only be ended by a supermajority of parliament. These actions forced Brussels to pressure Hungary with article seven, which suspends the voting rights of member states. Nonetheless, these threats are the only clear action taken by Brussels concerning the status of independent media; in the cases of The Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the EU remained silent.

In 2011, military police in The Czech Republic stormed Czech Television offices. Previously, according to the online publication Aktualne, military police visited the station the day before and seized copies of a leaked 2007 military intelligence document that spoke of alleged corruption in the Defense Ministry. Once again, the same common themes are present: the concern of political clientelism and the subsequent use of media as mouthpieces to further agendas, repression of media laws complemented by a lack of a strong judicial system to guarantee the freedom to report, and finally, the recurrent politicization of the Media Council. Moreover, this event came on the heels of a 2009 incident in the Czech Republic, in which a journalist was fined for reporting on a meeting between a lobbyist and a member of the president’s staff.

Problems were also highlighted in Poland and Bulgaria. Three journalists, for example, were subjected to a rare case of criminal-libel charges, one of which received a suspended prison sentence. The verdict stemmed from two February 2001 articles alleging that the speaker of the promotion and information unit of the Police City Council obtained his post through blackmail and used the position to promote his private advertising business. In Bulgaria, the government fined a weekly publication for printing a reader’s letter accusing a politician of corruption. These events, both large and small, demonstrate the overall decay of media freedom in Eastern Europe. Further criticisms from the EU, in this context, will only worsen the situation of an already feeble independent media in the region.

Conclusions

Brussels must ask itself if the media is sufficiently ‘decommunized’ or conversely, can these states have a liberal system with an illiberal media? Instead, however, the EU’s commissioned report on Romania – which criticizes the media for being overly harsh – shows little understanding of the contemporary domestic situation.

In 2012 Barroso stated, “The freedom of media is for us a sacred principle. It’s a problem of value, there can be no doubt about it.” While the EU did demonstrate a stronger position in Hungary, overall Brussels still lacks clarity. The EU must first find common ground between a strong local media sector and a comprehensive understanding of the domestic situation. Secondly, members of European Parliament must be persuaded to limit political influence in local media outlets.

A flawed intervention caused by a lack of understanding could lead people to perceive the EU as an overly controlling organism of society – a reputation that will not help the EU’s already crumbling credibility.

Opinions voiced by Global Minds do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Global Journal.

(Photo © DR)

Romania: The Tragic Comedy and Its Quiet Audience

2012-08-28T10:16:57Z

“Get out, you miserable dog!” For Romanian President Traian Basescu, this has been the recurrent chorus of the people publicly protesting against him. In January this year, Romania saw a minor resurgence of the revolutionary spirit of 1989. The riots of Bucharest were a surprising endeavor in a country often tagged as a place for resignation, acceptance and intrinsic idleness. For many, this was a response to austerity measures. But more importantly, this was a response to the further enrichment of the rich and the increased poverty of the poor. It was a response to an over-centralization of power and wealth, heavily exposed within the circles of the president. In this context, the last nine months represented a period of socio-political turmoil.

The Turmoil

Since January 2012, Basescu's party, the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) has slipped to less than 15 percent support in polls. Emil Boc's government stepped down in the aftermath of the January protests. The next government led by Mihai Razvan Ungureanu fell on 27 April, after losing a parliamentary vote of confidence. The current government, a result of political opposition to Traian Basescu, is led by Victor Ponta, head of the Social Democratic Party, part of the odd alliance between social-democrats and liberals, the Social-Liberal Union (USL). For many, this is an exceptionally negative vote towards PDL in a country where politicians are widely seen as corrupt individuals, driven by self-interest and with no coherent ideologies or policies. Political scientist Alina Mungiu Pippidi notes that "competitive clientelism rules in Romania, different cliques are engaged in a life-or-death battle to conquer the state in order to plunder it. Political parties in our young democracy are like medieval armies, whose recruits are not paid and live only from plunder. That explains the intensity of political battles, like the one we are now experiencing."

The growing bickering between Basescu and Ponta reached boiling point when the Prime Minister used his parliamentary majority to suspend the President. The grounds may seem weak, as the Constitution dictates that the head of state can be impeached only for grave illegal acts, but nothing in particular has been cited. In this context, the Constitutional Court ruled the referendum vote would be valid only with the participation of over 50 percent of the population. The European Commission, as well as US Ambassador in Bucharest Mark Gitenstein, and Phillip Gordon, Deputy to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, have voiced concerns over a number of decisions of the government: Ponta replaced the Ombudsman, seized control of the Monitorul Oficial (the official promulgator of laws and decrees), took over the national cultural institute and threatened the independence of the judges of the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, Ponta claims that he has freed the institutions from Basescu's corrupt influence. Even more so, throughout his suspension, Basescu repeatedly threatened to jail those who participated in this "coup d’etat,” and encouraged boycotts and non-participation at the referendum, an approach that his critics depicted as non democratic and authoritarian.

The referendum on impeachment took place on 29 July, with the official participation figures remaining around 46 percent. Approximately 88 percent of those who cast their votes supported the President's impeachment. The USL claimed that the number of 18.3 million voters was too high, while the National Institute for Statistics circulated documents that proved the number of voters was in fact approximately 16 million. Delayed decisions from the Constitutional Court, and more accusations of fraud from both sides, did nothing to legitimize either party in this conflict of interests. On 20 August, the Constitutional Court struck down the nationwide referendum and ignored the USL’s calls for revision of the electoral lists. The result was accepted by the USL, however, with acting President and leader of the liberals, Crin Antonescu, declaring: "we do respect the court decision and Traian Basescu will again become a president." At the same time, he emphasized that Basescu returns as an illegitimate president, clearly hinting at prolonged tensions. In the end, neither party involved accepted defeat.

The Quiet Audience

Throughout this tense period, Romanians have watched quietly the development of a tragic comedy. Despite his return, Basescu is fundamentally weak, non-credible and non-representative for approximately 8 million people. This is in a context in which he was re-elected with approximately 5 million votes in 2008, a much lower number than the group that voted for his impeachment. For many, Basescu sounds more and more incoherent in speeches, often threatening those who might go against him and his position. On the other hand, USL members seem puzzled, and often too lost to understand what to do. As seen in the electoral lists case, their preparation for the referendum was superficial, and Ponta’s political positions seem to change every day, undermining his credibility both at the domestic and foreign level. If once he promised “to never again speak to this man [Basescu] who will ram a knife into your back as soon as you turn around," in a recent interview for The Guardian he declared that he would be willing to cohabitate. Moreover, he admitted to mis-communicating with EU officials, opening doors for his critics in terms of perceived diplomatic shortcomings. At the moment, Romania is waiting for general elections in November. Basescu's conservatives are likely to officially lose their majority and the USL gain even greater power.

Even if the political tension can diffuse somewhat, this year's events have revealed massive cracks not only in the political system, but also in the social and civic systems. Romanian civil society is weak; for many, it is non-existent. Influential NGOs and think tanks are scarce. Outside an official or formal platform, the interest of citizens is fundamentally low. More importantly, the interest of the younger generation (18-24 years old) in understanding their civil rights, and how and what to vote for, is undeveloped – a result of a unilateral approach in a decaying education system. In essence, Romanian citizens do not exist in the public sphere. They are anonymous and voiceless. Communities are artificial and lack any significance. Romanians have accepted electoral fraud, weak political stances, and manifestations of corruption without protesting or pressuring their leaders. Undoubtedly, Romanians have become a quiet audience. The tragic comedy that the Romanian political scene has become in the last 20 years indeed has an audience, albeit bored and disgusted. Disappointed in the product, but rarely willing to express itself. Many people have withdrawn into their quiet corners, leaving their leaders to play the same roles over and over again. In January something snapped. But the voice of the people is still worryingly quiet.

(Photo © DR)

Opinions voiced by Global Minds do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Global Journal.