theglobaljournal.net: Latest activities of group Global Citizenship

The End of Globalization and Renaissance of The Welfare State

2013-12-04T08:07:39Z

Globalization and its influence on state sovereignty has been undoubtedly a topic of broad discussions and hot debates among academics, experts and policy makers. A popular idea developed recently is “the end of the welfare state” concept echoing that of The End of The History articulated by Francis Fukuyama. The end-of-the-welfare-state advocates usually claim the increasing economic globalization is limiting a number of policy options available to states, which entails a retrenchment of the welfare-state in developed nations. Yet, however clear the standpoint is, no comprehensive and profound explanation is provided on the roots of the phenomenon. Likewise, no policy implications are given based on the analysis of the changing nature of state sovereignty.

The proposed response to the article aims to fill in this gap. I would like to first pick up on the strong elements of the above-mentioned argument. I will then challenge this standpoint by claiming new trends are rising in the world that are anti-globalist in nature. My ultimate argument will be that globalization is in fact coming to a end. The world is entering a new era of post-globalization which could entail renaissance of the welfare-state.

The proponents of “the end of the welfare state” concept assert that capitalism has been changing the nature of state sovereignty. Namely, increasing globalization has undermined the sovereignty of nation-states to enact their own policies. Such limitations come from three main channels – trade and economic integration, financial markets and competition for employment. Furthermore, the neo-liberal ideology has asserted the primacy of the market over everything else, which is manifested via serious cutbacks to the welfare- state. All in all, the state's capacity to fulfil the 'welfare contract' has been undermined in the name of 'competitiveness and economic efficiency'.

The followers of the idea outlined are persuasive about the thesis of globalization-welfare state interrelation in the developed nations. As a rule, there is also an attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the concept of sovereignty. However, a number of important factors are omitted from such analysis, and several terminological confusions are created. All this, in my opinion, decreases the validity of the argument articulated.

As far as terminology is concerned, several remarks can be made. First of all, the concept of globalization is confined to the economic dimension only. There are talks about trade and economic integration, currency devaluation, international competition etc., while other important aspects of globalization are skipped, such as political, national, and cultural. In this regard, such phenomena as supranational entities (EU), transformation of national identities ('global citizenship'), and multiculturalism could be analysed in view of their influence onto the welfare-state. Secondly, the general assertion is the changing nature of sovereignty has led to understanding a nation-state as a 'welfare state'. However, few scholars specify that a welfare-state is a phenomenon of the more developed Western society. In other words, not all nation-states are welfare-states. Such disambiguation is critical in analyzing the ways globalization is affecting the capacity of welfare-states to conduct their policies. Finally, not all definitions are articulated in these discussions, e.g. 'capitalism', 'neo-liberal', 'developed democracies'.

It is the conceptual side of the argument, however, that needs most elaboration in my opinion. Let me explain in detail what can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the topic. I will then conclude my analysis with a counter-argument for the author's thesis, and will reveal the subsequent implications from my argument.

To begin with, the concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'nation-state' need to be analyzed in more detail. The end-of-the-welfare-state advocates tend to demonstrate the shift from 'sovereignty over a state' to 'sovereignty over people'. In both cases it is a state that exercises sovereignty, i.e. we talk about a 'sovereign state'. However, quite a lot in the academic and expert circles are talking rather about the sovereignty of the market, including such scholars as Colin Crouch, Saskia Sassen and Zygmunt Bauman. Thus, Crouch’s main contention is that the key institution of the post-democratic world is the global firm; Saskia Sassen explores economic and corporate citizenship under the hegemony of the world market; Zygmunt Bauman stipulates the sovereignty of a state and nation is being replaced by the sovereignty of the market. Indeed, the traditional national-democratic and social-democratic political model is based on the idea of a state or national sovereignty. Today, in contrast, we can witness the sovereignty of the world market which influences the structure of power, its responsibilities and the state-citizen relationship in every nation-state that ceases to be 'national' and is 'fading away'.

Furthermore, the changing nature of the sovereignty triggers transformation of the nation-state itself. Globalization has weakened the 'national dimension' of nation-states. Today a new type of a state is being constructed all around the globe. This is corporation-state, a candidate for replacing the 'outdated' nation-state that reached its peak of development in the period of 1850-1970's. Corporation-state is an entity of a primarily economic character (vs. political in a nation-state) aimed at minimizing costs and expenses. This is a state that acts as a corporation ruled by the economic effectiveness of the 'survival of the fittest'. The process of constructing such a state is taking place all over the world. It is slower where there is a civil society, a deep religious tradition (especially non-Western one), strong national identity, or where a states has big territory. Where is nothing to confront with, the process is sweeping and even violent.

My second claim to the-end-of-the-welfare-state argumentation is declaring 'a global economic foundation' a root cause for the changing nature of sovereignty and welfare-state. I agree globalization has diminished the sovereign capacity of nation-states for the last thirty years. In my view, however, the main reason for this shift is a deliberate act of the Western elites to dismantle the welfare-state, a process intensified by the end of the Cold War. On the factual side, the decline of 'The Glorious Thirty' (1945-1975) started with abandoning the Bretton Woods system by the US and the 1973 oil crisis. Two years later 'The Crisis of Democracy' report was written by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki at the request of the Trilateral Commission. This report clearly challenged the social achievements of the working class during 'The Glorious Thirty' period. It stated that further industrial development would entail a rapid growth of the working and middle classes, which could in turn bring about unwanted political forces. Thus, the shift from the policy of welfare-state to the policy of market fundamentalism (or neo-liberalism) was first initiated by Margaret Thatcher in Great in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 1981. This was accompanied by a decreasing technological progress, growing deindustrialization, and promoting fantasy to replace science fiction with for the mass culture. In other words, an attempt was made to create the 'New Middle Ages'.

Finally, while many talk about "decreasing the size and scope of the welfare state", perhaps the most important outcome of the process is omitted – social inequality. Increase in social inequality has been an alarming world trend lately affecting the US, the EU and the less prosperous countries. A serious structural social change is taking place with the middle class fading away. The social gap is increasing, with the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. Today the growth of GDP and national economies is no longer connected with the growth of well-being of nations, bur rather means increase in revenue of corporations and their top managers. In this regard, 'The New York Times' – a newspaper unlikely to be claimed 'socialist' – declared in one of the recent articles inequality undermines democracy, reporting it 'breeds resentment and political instability, eroding the legitimacy of democratic institutions'.

With all the considerations mentioned above, a question remains open: what happens to globalization? It has been claimed we are witnessing the crisis of the neoliberal model and the US hegemony. Combined with the current global economic crisis, the chances are very likely that globalization will turn drastically into ‘deglobalization’ and ‘regionalization’. And more and more signs are there to indicate the shift is taking place. The current crisis is exceptionally deep and structural, and cannot be resolved without a state interference into economy. In contrast, neo-liberalism hinders the capacity of states to conduct independent policies, and must therefore be reconsidered. The new world economic order will therefore mean decline of neo-liberalism in order to overcome the ongoing crisis. This will inevitably imply re-constructing the welfare-state as healthy, educated and socially-secured population is indispensable for the economic growth.

Let me draw a conclusion at this stage. Unlike the advocates of “the end of the welfare state” concept, who leave an open question on what or who will provide the economic and social rights to citizens, I strongly assert it is crucial to reinforce the welfare-state in order to cope with the challenges of the newly emerging world order. Only a renaissance of the social welfare-state may be a viable alternative to a corporation-state. It is this trend that, optimistically, will make the world economically more stable and politically acceptable.

An Alternative to Davos: interview with Michael Aminian

2013-11-08T08:57:29Z

Back in June 2013, a G8 meeting was imminent, announced by a flood of editorial coverage, political declarations and alter-globalization protests advocating the rights of the “Rest” over the “West”. The G8 was to take place in London—under UK presidency for the first time since Gleneagles in 2005— and spoke particularly to a country that had seen globalization raise all sorts of questions in the previous year, from multinationals’ tax avoidance scandals to the murder of a British soldier in the streets of London that revived anti-immigration sentiments.

Yet this time around, there was novelty among the predictable: personalities such as Paul Collier, David Miliband, Mary Robinson and Baroness Amos came together at Tate Modern to debate various facets of “global citizenship” as part of a two-week long ‘Cultural Forum’. Highlights included Nigerian novelist Ben Okri’s eloquent argument in favour of (re)inventing a language of globalization that would more accurately reflect current trends and identities; and Unilever CEO Paul Polman’s compelling presentation of his grand vision for sustainable businesses. The Global Journal speaks to the man behind the Cultural Forum and founder of Zamyn, Michael Aminian. His organisation has a powerful vision for an alternative to Davos: a cultural forum that aims to reconcile globalization with its true agents, the citizens of the world.

Zamyn means ‘ground’ in Farsi. What is Zamyn and how does its name relate to its purpose?

Zamyn is a sociocultural analytical organisation that was created by myself with a group of artists. We actively started in 2004, but the idea was there long before—it got delayed because of 09.11, as the focus then was on other issues. We wanted to give the organization a name that was truly global, bottom-up, and that acknowledged of the role of the individual in globalization. ‘Zamyn’ means ‘ground’ in both Farsi and Urdu, and we felt it reflected our aim of opening up the discussion of globalization to a wider population. While the cultural side of globalization is much discussed in academic circles, artists are the ambassadors of culture, and that is why Zamyn is structured around them. And, while businesses are also crucial and need to be aware that they are shifting the way culture shapes and reshapes itself, those who can explain this change are the academics, artists and writers. Therefore, Zamyn is not a consultancy but an analytical agency, which works with these individuals to analyse, document and define how culture is shaped by globalization and vice versa.

What personal journey led you to found the organisation?

As you can tell from my surname, I was born in Iran, but my family left the country in 1962. We stayed in Germany and France first, and ended up in UK. My comfort zone had been torn: I came from a totally alienated part of the world, and had to switch from a Middle-Eastern to a European culture. I was leading something of a double life between my parents’ traditional mentality and my British life. Those of us who lived like that at the time were like the guinea pigs of globalization.

Like a lot of second-generation immigrants, I faced the difficult responsibility as a child of fulfilling the hopes of my parents. I ended up studying biochemistry, yet I had no interest in continuing with research, nor in working with the family agricultural business, as at that point, my identity had shifted away from the traditional Iranian way of life. I spent about 10-15 years writing for both the Mail on Sunday and for Teheran Times, and continued to wonder where my loyalty lied. Psychoanalysis, in particular the Lacanian School, gave me the right vocabulary through which to understand my identity. I therefore began having analysis, which in the Middle-Eastern culture is unusual—people would ask me whether there was something wrong with me and I would say: ‘I am just a protégé of globalization, I am puzzled by my identity.’ I think psychoanalysis gave me a vision, an idea of the way forward.

Then, I was diagnosed with cancer, and that was a wake-up call. I had to grow up at that point and ask myself: what am I really going to deliver? I was an art collector, but I knew I was not an artist, nor a writer. However, what I did have was this experience of a global existence. Globalization was very much coming to the forefront at the time and, while it belonged to the individual, the public, economic globalization threatened to highjack it. How could we come up with a formula that prevented this from happening? We decided to create an organisation that allows the individual to be heard and recognises that they are the real asset and agent of globalization. If you look at who has been invited to be part of Zamyn, they have all either written about, or lived the process of, globalization.

Next came the challenge of how to communicate with the public: at the beginning, academic institutions expressed a lot of interest, because in a sense globalization was a very academic notion and academia consciously or unconsciously did not want to let go of its ownership of it. So we began with the London School of Economics in 2005, through a series of seminars about Culture and Globalization, chaired by Professor Henrietta L. Moore. It was a success from an academic perspective, but stopping there would defeat Zamyn’s purpose. We therefore decided on an intellectual cultural forum that would complement Davos’ World Economic Forum, would happen biennially and would be based in London. Historically, it is the place to be: it was the capital of colonisation, and London has to take ownership of its past to move forward.

What do you believe prompted such diverse personalities such as Sir Anthony Giddens, Baroness Amos or Anish Kapoor to join Zamyn?

The reason why Anish Kapoor, who is a good friend, and other theorists, analysts, artists or visionary business leaders—which is rare—were identified was because they are addressing the issue of globalization through their work. Also, I made sure that they knew that the Zamyn platform would function at the most rigorous level. These people have spent years unveiling their own theory, perfecting their work whether it is a book, a lecture, or an installation. We cannot allow the standard of an Anish Kapoor or a Steve McQueen to drop, and many organisations that approach them do not uphold this standard.

Zamyn aims at « challenging powerful categories » of centre and periphery, and creating a « shift in social attitudes ». Why is a change in consciousness so important? How does the arts contribute to it?

The West needs to develop a different approach to the so-called ‘peripheral’, ‘developing’ regions of the world. It is archaic and patronising, and unhelpful on a cultural, economic and political level. Given the current crisis in the West, it is even farcical from an economic point of view. The only way forward is by the inclusion of the rest of the world. Where Zamyn, the analysts and the artists come in is in the rephrasing, the reshaping of identity, taking it out of the intellectual space to a grass-roots level. When someone gets murdered for political or religious reasons, the attacker’s motivation sometimes stems from being degraded by those who are dominant. Zamyn aims to interrogate this relationship of dominance and rebellion.

More recently, we have started using the term “new emerging countries”, which is quite interesting linguistically: some consider this denomination an honour, but I feel it is a misrepresentation. Indeed, from a cultural point of view, how can they be “new” or “emerging”? They are built upon timeless civilizations! Once again, it fits from an economic point of view, it is another way of saying they are “fertile ground” for business from the West to move in. And, when that sort of approach is taken, it breeds bad feelings, the wrong flavour of working together. We do not believe in that at all here at Zamyn.

The Cultural Forum 2013 was on the theme of « Global Citizenship » in the lead up to the G8 summit in Ireland. Why is global citizenship important when thinking about the G-s?

The original theme was going to be migration and immigration. Migration is often a very healthy process, but one that the majority of the West does not understand. And when they do, they only handpick the aspects of it that they see as beneficial. However, as it was a difficult sell at the beginning, we decided to translate it into something softer, namely global citizenship.

Zamyn’s Chair, Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, made some excellent contributions at the final “Lessons for the G8” event, available online on the Zamyn Forum website. The G8 as a concept is defunct: eight leaders trying to run the world is a formula that does not fit in an era of globalization. To paraphrase our panellist Ian Bremmer, the world is more of a « G-zero » at the moment, rather than a G8, 7 or 20. One suggestion for the G8 that came out of the various debates is that they should at the very least try to include the rest of society, perhaps as through a sort of think tank, rather than keep a top-down, elitist form of decision-making.

What would be for you a criterion of success in the coming years?

It is a tough question, because I have such high standards. After eight years of psychoanalysis, I believe you never really arrive at an end product! However, if we can put on the map a real intellectual cultural forum, that truly embraces the process of globalization and allows the public to take an ownership of it, if we achieve 50% of that, I will regard it to be successful.

Laura Bullon-Cassis

www.zamynforum.org

www.zamyn.org

Rediscovering The Utopian In Europe: An Interview With Philippe Van Parijs

2013-03-27T11:15:40Z

Philippe Van Parijs is a central figure in the worlds of philosophy and politics alike. Described by Amartya Sen as “one of the most original and creative thinkers of our time,” he is famous for his defense of a Universal Basic Income – an unconditional monthly grant allocated to all – as the best expression of social justice and freedom. Building on the thought-provoking exchange between Francis Fukuyama and Jürgen Habermas published in May, this special extended interview challenges us to imagine a fairer future for the European project.

In their interview in this magazine last year, Jürgen Habermas and Francis Fukuyama suggested the financial crisis had revealed the weaknesses of the European Union (EU). There seems to be a critical lack of trust, solidarity and cohesion – what is your diagnosis?

Solidarity is easy when it does not cost much. When a crisis hits and the amounts involved reach unprecedented levels, indignation can easily erupt on both sides. Net contributors start quibbling about whether the trouble they are being asked to relieve is self-inflicted, and try to impose conditions meant to cure the source of the trouble and prevent its repeat. Net beneficiaries, on the other hand, resent the conditionalities attached to the help they are given and eagerly believe in stories that place part of the responsibility for the trouble at the feet of net contributors.

Solidarity is also more difficult to manage when different cultures are involved. For example, having just one word [schuld] to refer to both debt and culpability – as is the case in German and Dutch – is bound to make some difference when indebted countries call for solidarity. The best predictor of a government’s stance on solidarity is not, I am told, whether it is expected to pay or receive, but rather, whether its population belongs in the main to a Protestant or Catholic tradition. In one view, those who default must be punished even if everyone is worse off as a result. According to the other, sinners can get full absolution. This is just one illustration of why solidarity will always be trickier at the EU level than in more culturally homogeneous political communities. But being trickier does not make it impossible, nor less necessary.

Habermas rejects the appropriateness of the German and American federal model for Europe, arguing it is too ambitious and unnecessary – do you agree federalism is the wrong way forward? What is federalism?

A family of systems of government that involve at least two levels of democratic functioning with a significant set of competences entrenched at each level. The more competences are exercised at the higher level and the more difficult it is for lower-level entities to reappropriate those competences, the more one moves towards a unitary state. The more competences are exercised at the lower level and the more difficult it is for the higher-level polity to reappropriate those competences, the more one moves towards a confederation of sovereign states.

The EU is very far from being a unitary state, but it has also become quite a bit more than a confederation. The competences it exercises are substantial and entrenched enough to make the label ‘federal’ appropriate. Transferring back to member states some of these competences – or making it easier for each national government to reappropriate any of them – could turn the EU into a sheer confederation. But notwithstanding some facile anti-EU rhetoric, all calls for significant moves in this direction lose momentum as soon as people figure out the implications. Within the Eurozone, there is now a widespread awareness that more powers need to be transferred upward if the common currency is to be sustainable.

It does not follow, however, that the EU should try to fashion itself after either the German or American federal models. This would mean having a federal police force and federal tax collectors, abolishing the right of exit and dispensing with unanimity among member states for constitutional changes. I agree with Habermas that a direct transposition of such a model is not what our multi-national, multilingual entity needs. The EU can become a stronger and more efficient federation, with two significant and entrenched levels of democratic decision making, without needing to be turned into a genuine federal state.

Habermas also argues the lack of trust and cohesion between European states is due to the incapacity of elites to transcend their own national concerns and embrace a European agenda.

Some European elites do wish to transcend national concerns. But political leaders are electorally accountable to the citizens of their respective countries. If they sacrifice national concerns to the European agenda, they run a high risk of being replaced by their rivals. The culprits, therefore, are less the main players than the rules of the game they have no option but to play. Of course, if the electorates themselves were guided by Europe’s common good rather than by national self-interest, there would be no problem. But with media and parties fragmented along national divides, there is no way this could happen. Against this background, much of the art of European governance consists in achieving good compromises between positions steered by national concerns. It requires generating sufficient trust and mutual understanding between national leaders with enough authority over political majorities and public opinion. Given the existing institutional framework, it is the capacity of political elites to manage this that represents the key to progress.

You have argued the main catalyst for European citizenship ought to be a form of European social redistribution – what do you mean, especially by the notion of a ‘euro-dividend’?

A euro-dividend, like any other form of EU-wide social redistribution, may work as a catalyst for European citizenship, just as Bismarck’s pension system was arguably a major factor in turning the people of Bavaria, Prussia or Rhineland into German citizens. But this is not my primary reason for proposing it. The immediate reason is that some background conditions need to be satisfied sufficiently for a common currency to be sustainable, given the countries sharing that currency no longer have the option of adjusting to adverse conditions through devaluation.

The theory of optimal currency areas identified four such conditions: homogeneity, flexibility, mobility and solidarity. These conditions are, on the whole, far better satisfied by American states than by the EU’s member states. Firstly, homogeneity across member states in terms of sectoral specialization is low in both the United States (US) and the EU because of the single market. It is likely to drop even further in the EU as time allows the comparatively recent single market to produce more effects. Secondly, the downward flexibility of nominal wages and prices is not great in the US and far lower, on average, in the EU, because many member states have far stronger trade unions, a more developed welfare state and more constraining labor legislation. Thirdly, the mobility of workers across state borders is about six times lower in the EU than in the US and is unlikely to increase much, if only as a result of the EU’s linguistic fragmentation. Finally, financial solidarity across states (when one is doing worse) is estimated – depending on the index used – to be between 20 and 50 times greater in the US than in the EU.

If we want the euro to survive beyond the short term, one or more of these four background conditions must be better satisfied. Improving the EU’s performance significantly in terms of the first three conditions is either impossible, or undesirable, or both. The best chance for the euro is therefore to satisfy far better the fourth condition: solidarity. The EU’s 27 welfare states have developed historically along quite distinct paths, reflecting different power relations and public debates. Their structures are very diverse and their generosity – along many dimensions – very unequal. Even comparatively minute reforms are highly sensitive politically. It is an illusion to believe that we shall ever have, or indeed that we should ever have, a unified EU-wide mega welfare state analogous to the US. We must think of a far simpler, rougher form of cross-border redistribution, which will not replace the existing national welfare states, but fit beneath them.

Hence, my proposal of a universal euro-dividend organized and funded at the level of the Eurozone or EU as a whole. Such a scheme could not be funded by social security contributions, which should be earmarked for social insurance benefits. Nor could it be funded by a personal income tax, if only because the definition of taxable income is again too diverse among member states and too politically sensitive. One might think of a ‘Tobin tax’ on financial transactions, or of a carbon tax on CO2 emissions. But this could only finance, under optimistic assumptions, an EUwide euro-dividend of about €10 or €14, respectively. More promising is a reliance on the most Europeanized of all taxes: the Value Added Tax (VAT). For instance, an EU-wide VAT of 20 percent would fund a monthly eurodividend of €200.

Photography courtesy of Rita Scaglia for The Global Journal.

The Boundaries of Life

2013-01-23T07:44:43Z

On Borders, Ostkreuz Agency Photographers, Hatje Cantz, Ð38.00.

They offer protection, lead to war, limit freedom or enable it; they have always been there and will continue to exist: borders. Hardly anything else is as socially ambivalent, as timeless and as relevant. The Ostkreuz Agency was founded when what was probably the most important border in the history of Germany – the Berlin Wall– disappeared. Two decades later, its photographers set out on a search for today’s frontiers. Their pictures portray groups of indigenous peoples battling for their land in Canada, homosexuals in Palestine seeking exile in the enemy country of Israel, and the discovery of state identity in South Sudan. The focus is always on people: how do boundaries influence their everyday lives?

On Borders covers many borders dissecting the planet, but there are some that seem less recognized: European borders. Many European Union (EU) citizens have experienced a changing and expanding border as EU territory is extended. Most who enter the EU illegally still elect to take the route from Turkey to Greece, which leads across the Evros River or along a country road. But the days when countries tried to halt these migrants with barbed wire, police and guard dogs are over. Ever since the advent of the Frontex Agency, a kind of common EU border patrol, technology is being upgraded along the edges of Europe.

Using infrared cameras, motion detectors and electric fences –alarmingly resembling human traps– more and more immigrants are being turned away. But still more are taking their chances. In 2011, according to Frontex’s report, the number of individuals arrested rose by 35 percent from 104,000 in 2010 to 141,000 in 2011. In the future, the organization plans to use robots and drones. Walking in Athens today, one can see an increasing number of illegal immigrants wandering the streets, looking for any opportunity to eat and make a living.

On Borders is made by exceptional journalists using their cameras to inspire us to observe and reflect. We need more books like this.

- JCN

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An End to the Eurozone as We Know it?

2012-11-02T16:59:29Z

While the financial crisis continues to shake Europe, some economists are beginning to tout a miracle remedy: divide up the Eurozone to allow countries in difficulty, led by Greece, to reap the benefits of a devalued currency. Could the Eurozone be saved by a split? While all efforts remain focused on preserving regional unity, European elites are now pondering the question. Can we still hope for a happy ending?

“Leave the euro to the PIGS!” is the rather provocative advice American economist, Allan Meltzer, has offered to European political leaders. “Europeans keep throwing money at problems and insisting on short-term palliatives,” he noted sternly in the Wall Street Journal. “Europe’s responsible countries should establish their own new currency union.” A union limited, in Meltzer’s view, to those who adopt binding communal fiscal restraints. The new currency could float against the euro, allowing the European currency to be devalued and offering countries in difficulty – Greece, most obviously, but also Italy, Spain and Portugal – an increased ability to compete.

On the other side of the Atlantic, observers had not waited for Meltzer’s directive to start thinking about a multi-tier Eurozone. At the end of 2011, reports surfaced of “intense” discussions between France and Germany about resizing the Eurozone. “We need to move very cautiously, but the truth is that we need to establish exactly the list of those who don’t want to be part of the club and those who simply cannot be part,” a senior European official, who preferred to remain anonymous, explained. European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Olli Rehn, immediately responded with an emphatic denial. “If the final goal is to safeguard the stability of the Eurozone, it is obvious that a fragmentation does not serve this objective,” reiterated his spokesperson. “Every proposal must be based on preserving the unity of the Eurozone.”

In the minds of the euro’s architects, however, the subject is no longer taboo. Otmar Issing, a highly respected former Chief Economist of the European Central Bank, has already caused a sensation by suggesting the Eurozone might only be saved at the cost of resizing. “Everything speaks in favor of saving the euro area,” he declared. “How many countries will be able to be part of it in the long term remains to be seen.” More categorically still, former President of the Federation of German Industry, Hans-Olaf Henkel, has urged Germany, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands to form their own monetary union. Concrete projects have even circulated publicly via the media – for instance, Markus Kerber’s ‘Guldenmark’. Kerber, a professor at Berlin’s Technical University, proposes authorizing countries that demonstrate a surplus in their balance of payments to introduce a parallel currency.

It would be an understatement to say the idea of a multitiered Eurozone has inflamed the German academic world in the last year. The issue has inspired some of the country’s most prominent economists, such as the President of the Ifo Institute in Munich, Hans-Werner Sinn, who, together with Friedrich Sell, suggests transforming the Eurozone into an “open monetary union.” The countries risking expulsion from the European monetary zone would be offered associate membership status, allowing them to adopt their own currency provisionally, but with the option to rejoin the Eurozone at a later date. “Countries would not be expelled from the club; their full membership would simply lie dormant for a couple of years,” explained Sinn and Sell in the Financial Times. “That would be a significant psychological factor making governments, and their electorates, more willing to persevere with painful economic reforms.”

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by Guillaume Meyer

When the Media Speak European

2012-10-29T18:59:58Z

European Identity: What the Media Say, Paul Bailey & Geoffrey Williams (eds), Oxford University Press £55.00.

This volume presents parts of the findings of the IntUne Project, a transnational quadrennial project questioning the idea of European citizenship in an ever closer Europe. As researchers across Poland, France, Italy and the UK analyze television news and newspapers, the reader learns that the European Commission appears overwhelmingly as the heart of EU governance; that Italian newspapers feature more negative representations of refugees and immigrants than UK newspapers; and that the idea of ‘European’ history remains multifarious and uncertain. Researchers used an innovative methodology combining quantitative (computer-assisted analysis) and qualitative methods (discourse analysis) that will be particularly exciting for academics in linguistics and media studies. Yet, the authors were also careful to write in layman’s terms for anyone interested in issues of European institutions, identity and governance. Although the linguistic plurality of the volume makes it original, one can regret the absence of Germany in the project. Similarly, the online evolution of news media, and more generally the material context of news production are not addressed. But European Identity provides a thorough overview of the language used by the media to represent Europe – and shows, dialectically, how the media contribute to constructing a certain idea of Europe.

-T. N.

If Europe Thinks – Will It Be?

2012-05-18T19:39:48Z

The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, by Jürgen Habermas, Polity Press, £16.99, €19.80.

Philosophy is a very refreshing exercise when meeting a great philosopher. As one of those great minds, Habermas has also kept his unique voice, using it load and clear. In his latest book, he confronts the factors threatening to derail the European project. “The eurozone countries are heading toward a situation in which they will have to choose between a deepening of European cooperation and relinquishing the euro.” While many people expect to see the end of the euro in the next five years, Habermas turns his attention towards the weak point of Europe: the intimacy of its relations with its citizens. After the failure of the Laken operation - remember the European constituent under the French presidency of Valérie Giscard d'Estaing - the attempt to bring together citizens from the European policy-making spheres seems to have sunk into indifference. In addition, the fact that the theme of ‘Europe’ does not sell well at local or national election contests, measures the sad opinion the average citizen has of Europe. So, we should rejoice that a philosopher like Habermas is not giving up, but calling the European elite to order. He sees an opportunity in the crisis. “With a little backbone the crisis of the single currency can bring about what some once hoped for from a common European foreign policy, namely a cross-border awareness of a shared European destiny.” On the other hand, is Habermas perhaps over-optimistic? Won't the “little political backbone” he mentions be, in reality, hard to find?

-J.C.N.

Shanghai's Global Nights

2012-05-18T18:21:07Z

It’s hard to be more global than the nights in Shanghai. After experiencing the night life of Berlin, Paris, New York, Barcelona, Dubai, you must plunge into the most wideawake night life on the planet. Shanghai nights are just like the country itself – exploding with energy, yet cautious about joining the mêlée. Young Chinese and expats from all over the world mingle together in a deluge of music ‘made in China’ – and elsewhere. Globalization is here, in the Shanghai nighttime.

There is no place like Hengshan Lu. Every night of the week, the road gets completely congested around 10pm, when taxi cabs start queuing in front of the numerous clubs, blocking the way for the rest of the traffic. The sounds of loud and repetitive beats can be heard from far away. As you approach the main part of the street, luxury cars appear like the highlight of the latest auto show; Ferrari, Porsche and Maserati are parked directly on the sidewalk, where it is absolutely forbidden to park during the day. The smell of grilled food coming from street vendors fills the sidewalk. The Hengshan road crowd is young in age. Groups of girls, wearing only a few square centimeters of clothing, are passing through the various club doorways. MT, Phoebe, CD3, Westside – different names but same basic concept. Very loud music, hundreds of tables, more or less private, a bar and a small dance floor accommodate a mixed crowd of customers and staff. Most of the customers are playing a variety of alcoholic games involving dice….

About ten years ago, most of the club scene was concentrated in a few streets like Hengshan Road. With the development of Shanghai and the arrival of many foreign investors, the scene has spread all over the city. The small clusters of bars have grown exponentially, slowly adapting to the new and more demanding Shanghai crowd. From just a few music clubs very similar to each other, the city is now offering every kind of venue, from high-end whisky bars to small underground dives, clubs, live houses, and regular corner bars.

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Text and photography by Tim Franco for The Global Journal

The European Citizen: Just a Myth?

2012-05-18T18:04:54Z

As Jürgen Habermas’ new book "The Crisis of the European Union: A Response" arrived at bookstores, The Global Journal asked Francis Fukuyama to interview the German philosopher, one of the most influential thinkers of our time. In a highly relevant and exclusive discussion, Professor Fukuyama and Professor Habermas articulate Europe’s most pressing issues, such as the building of a more integrated political Europe, its democratic foundations, the role of its citizens and Europe’s future. This unique interview also leads to global governance issues; Europe is still a promising laboratory for ideas on new political orders.

My first question concerns the meaning of European citizenship. Of the two constitutive legs of your new Europe, the one of peoples is at this moment far better constituted, and in fact has been greatly strengthened due to the animosities aroused by the current crisis. The abstract ideal of European citizenship, on the other hand, has always existed since the early days of the EU and finds expression in voting for the European Parliament. But it has very little emotional or substantive content at this point. You speak of “the expectation that the growing mutual trust among European peoples will give rise to a transnational, though attenuated, form of civic solidarity among the citizens of the Union.” (p. 29). But on what will this trust be based?

Allow me to address the normative and empirical aspects of your question separately. The idea of “shared sovereignty” – shared between Europeans in their role as EU citizens and these same people in their role as members of one of the participating nation states – must be developed from the roots of the constitution-building process. This idea has an important implication for how we should conceive of the future shape of a democratized Political Union. If we are to cease shirking the question of the “finalité” of the unification process, we must lay down the correct parameters. A federal state on the model of the United States or the German federal republic is the wrong model; for that would be to set an unrealistically ambitious goal – one more ambitious than is necessary or sensible. There is no need to introduce a new level of federal administration; almost all administrative functions can remain with the member states. And a Commission that would have been transformed into a government would not have to be predominantly responsible toward the European Parliament, as required by the pattern of a federal state. For the purpose of democratic legitimation it would be sufficient that a European government be responsible in equal measure to the Parliament and the Council in which the national governments are represented. From an empirical perspective, your question puts a finger on a sore point. It is true that the citizens will always have closer ties to their nation state than to the European Union; however, the fact that, to date, insufficient mutual trust has developed among the European peoples is also a consequence of the failure of the political elites. The latter have so far evaded all European themes; in their national public arenas, they make “Europe” responsible for unpopular decisions in which they themselves have participated in Brussels. Even more important is that, to date, a European election or a European referendum worthy of the name has never been conducted in any member state; citizens have only voted on national themes and made choices among national politicians, while European issues and tickets were hidden away, as it were. As a result of this irresponsible behavior, the politicians are now facing a dilemma. As soon as the citizens realized in the present crisis how profoundly the political decisions taken in Brussels already impinge on their everyday lives, their interest was aroused. If that suspicious attention to European issues were interpreted in the right way by the citizens, they could become equally aware of sharing a common fate.

Haven’t we been going backwards very rapidly?

One must distinguish the longer-term dispositions from the current events that stirred up emotions. The two-faced way in which the European governments have dealt with the financial crisis over the past two years is scandalous. They negotiate behind closed doors and doctor the results arrived at in Brussels for domestic consumption, out of fear of their own electorates. That foments mutual national prejudices and has corresponding effects on the public moods reflected in opinion polls. On the other hand, Europe has long since become a matter of course for the younger generations. What do you think the opinion polls would look like if the monetary union were to be dissolved? The young people would be flabbergasted if they suddenly had to show their passports and change their money again sixteen times when hitchhiking across Europe.

You place your constitutional project in the context of “a democratic legal domestication and civilization of state power.” This has of course been key to the European project from the beginning.

That’s perhaps too easily said. Here we are dealing with the very first instance of an accommodation of sovereign nation states – moreover, the first generation of particularly self-confident nation states with their own imperial pasts – to the postnational constellation of an emerging world society.

But isn’t the weakness of current European identity due to the fact that it has been described in such largely negative terms, i.e., to be a European means to be against war, against national selfishness, etc., instead of in positive terms, e.g., “I am proud to be member of a European civilization that represents X or Y” as positive values? And if so, how do we define those values and what kind of education project is necessary to give them meaning?

Jan Werner Müller, a younger professor of political science at Princeton university, recently rebutted the frequently heard accusation of the “failure of European intellectuals” with an argument that I find convincing. The expectation that the intellectuals should construct a “grand European narrative,” a European “identity,” with the aid of a new founding myth remains captive to a “nineteenth-century logic,” he argued. After all, the now well-studied history of the “invention” of national consciousness by historiography, the press, and school curricula during the nineteenth century, in view of its horrible consequences, does not provide an inviting example. We in Europe are still coming to terms with forms of ethnonational aggression – as is shown, even within the EU, by the example of Hungary. This is why I think it is sufficient to cite a couple of concrete demographic and economic statistics to remind ourselves of the diminishing weight of Europe in the world and to ask ourselves whether we must not pull ourselves together if we want to remain in a position to defend our cultural and social forms of life against the leveling force of the global economy – and, most importantly, to maintain a certain amount of influence on the international political agenda in accordance with our universalistic conceptions.

To read the full interview subscribe or order a copy of The Global Journal.

The European Citizen: Just a Myth?

Why European Identity Will Never Work: Case Study 'EU Vs. USSR'

#59 - Anti-Slavery International

2012-01-23T14:14:20Z

Check out if Anti-Slavery International is in The Top 100 NGOs 2013 Edition!

Fighting against modern slavery in all its forms.

170 years of enduring impact.

Despite the lauded achievements of the abolitionist movement two centuries ago, slavery still exists today. Anti-Slavery International, founded in 1839 following the passing of Britain’s Slavery Abolition Act, is the world’s oldest international human rights organization and the most prominent in the continuing contemporary global fight against slavery in all its forms – from bonded and forced labor, to human trafficking, early and forced marriage, and ‘slavery by descent’.

Committed to the eradication of slavery and slavery-like practices, Anti-Slavery International pursues a multi-faceted strategy of investigation, public awareness raising and campaigning, support for grassroots organizations in affected areas, and advocacy for a more effective legal framework. This approach has achieved real change. The organization has been involved in successful campaigns to stop the abuse of rubber workers in the Belgian Congo and the use of child slaves – Mui Tsai – in Hong Kong. More recently, it has been working towards the eradication of child trafficking and slavery in the cocoa industry, the use of child labor in Uzbek cotton production, and forced labor practices in Indian brick kilns, quarries and garment factories.

At the systemic level, Anti-Slavery International is working energetically to establish international legal standards for the rights of domestic workers, and towards a victim-centered approach to anti-trafficking policies in Europe.